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1. Introduction 
The main form of ownership of large companies operating in all parts of the economy has been ownership by 
shareholders, who can buy and sell shares freely through the stock market. The companies are typically 
groups specialising in one or more sectors, such as water, electricity and gas. Because they are quoted on the 
stock market they have to publish a lot of information about the company, for the benefit of investors, but 
this information is also helpful to others, including employees and trade unions. 
 
More recently, financial investors have begun to take major shareholdings in some companies. Some of these 
are ‗private equity‘ firms (PE), which specialise in buying all shares so they become ‗privately‘ owned. The 
PE companies normally expect to make their money by improving the value of companies to investors, and 
then selling the company at a profit a few years later, and meanwhile load the companies with heavier debt 
burdens. As the funds buy a company, they normally remove it from the stock exchange, and so there is no 
obligation to publish detailed data, eg quarterly earnings figures, and can operate without public scrutiny. 
 
The activity of PE investors has become very controversial. In Germany, they were described as ―locusts‖ 
during the 2006 election campaigns. This is because PE funds have often introduced sharp cuts in 
employment, or sold off parts of a company, in order to make the company more valuable when they sell it 
on. The companies are thus seen as a threat to jobs, stability, and to local control of utilities and other 
businesses. Financial commentators have also expressed concerns that the funds activities may not be 
sustainable, so there are greater dangers of bankruptcies. 
 
The PE funds are active in all sectors of the economy, including manufacturing, services, and retail, and also 
including private companies operating in public services, such as water, electricity, waste management and 
healthcare. Thus an increasing number of workers in these services are now employed by companies owned 
by PE funds.   
 
One category of funds, the so-called infrastructure funds, is of particular relevance to public service 
operations.  These aim to invest specifically in network industries such as electricity, gas, water, telecoms, 
roads, airports, post, and health and social care, to give a steady return over a long period of time. There is 
also a global trend to reduce the use of equity finance in utilities and replace it with debt.  These two 
developments may have different implications from the activities of the private equity funds. 
 
This paper discusses the implications of the growth of PE in public services and utility companies in Europe.  
 
 
It consists of three main sections: 
 
- the nature and size of the PE firms 
- the investments of the major PE firms in public service sectors 
- some of the issues raised by these developments 
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2. Private equity funds 
2.1. Private equity 
Private equity (PE) consists of the shares of companies which are privately owned, i.e. not publicly quoted 
on the stock exchange and so not subject to the disclosure rules of the stock exchange.  
 
PE funds are created as partnerships by financial services firms, by inviting investors like pension funds or 
rich people to commit a certain amount.  The funds are then used to invest either in companies which are not 
quoted on the stock exchange – ‗private‘ companies -  or in companies which are listed, following which 
they are usually turned into private companies and so ‗de-listed‘. Each firm may have a number of different 
funds. 
    
The firms make money by charging commission fees on the money invested, and by getting a return on their 
own investment in the deal. The other investors get their return through cash payments made by the fund out 
of the profits from the investments, and from their share of the sale price of the company, or parts of the 
company, when they are sold on. 
2.2. PE firms 
The largest private equity firms are listed in the tables below.  The sector is dominated by a number of large 
firms, mainly based in the USA, but operating internationally.  
 
Compared with top US buyout groups, European private equity firms tend to be small and confined to 
national markets, but a number of UK firms, such as Terra Firma, are very active elsewhere in Europe. In 
2004, only 14% of all private equity and venture capital investments in Europe were outside the country of 
origin.1 Macquarie Bank of Australia is also a significant international PE firm, especially in utilities and 
infrastructure. 
 
The main groups may act alone in buying companies, or in partnership with each other. For example, in 2006 
the Dutch publishing company VNU was bought by a consortium of AlpInvest Partners N.V., The 
Blackstone Group L.P., The Carlyle Group, Hellman & Friedman LLC, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. 
and Thomas H.Lee Partners, L.P.  One reason for this is that funds need to combine in order to amass the 
money to bid for such large companies.  In 2006 authorities in the USA started investigations of joint 
buyouts by a number of PE firms because of concerns over collusion and insider trading. 2  
 
Table 1.  Largest private equity funds 2005 
  Total funds 
(USD $ billions 
Goldman Sachs USA 35.9 
Blackstone Group USA 30.9 
Carlyle Group USA 28.9 
Warburg Pincus USA 21.8 
Kohlberg, Kravitz, Roberts (KKR) USA 20.5 
Apax Partners USA 20.1 
Apollo USA 19.0 
Harbourvest USA 17.7 
Oaktree USA 17.6 
CVC USA 15.3 
Source: Thomson Venture Economics, NVCA 
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Table 2.  Other private equity firms active in Europe 
PE firm Country 
3i UK 
Barclays Bank UK 
Bridgepoint  Capital UK 
Macquarie Bank Australia 
Montagu PE UK 
Morgan Stanley USA 
PAI partners France 
Penta Czech republic/Cyprus 
Permira Germany 
Terra Firma UK 
 
2.3. Sources of finance: investors in PE funds  
PE funds have become popular with investors in recent years because they have achieved good returns 
compared with traditional investments in publicly quoted shares. Large amounts of money are thus being 
invested in them: in 2005 the total invested in European PE funds was nearly €60 billion – more than double 
the amount in 2004.  
 
The biggest single investors in European PE funds are banks and pension funds, followed by insurance 
companies. These three groups account for two-thirds of all money invested in PE funds in 2005. They also 
account for almost the whole of the large increase from 2004 to 2005. Investment in PE funds by pension 
funds and insurance companies is expected to continue growing. In the USA, such institutional investors 
allocate about 7.5% of their funds to PE, whereas European institutions invest only about 4% in PE (and 
Japanese institutions only about 2.5%).3 
 
Some pension funds are beginning to act like PE investors themselves, as well as participating in funds of PE 
firms. The Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (Canada) is a large investor in Macquarie‘s infrastructure fund 
(see below), and has also bought direct major shareholdings in utility companies like Northumbrian Water 
(UK), and Scotia Gas, a gas distribution company in Scotland, in which it owns 25%, in partnership with 
another Canadian pension fund and the UK energy company. Ontario Teachers have also set up their own PE 
operation, Teachers Private Capital, which partnered the PE fund Providence Equity to buy the German cable 
TV company Kabel Deutschland – Ontario teachers own 8%, Providence owns 88%.  
Table 3.  Sources of new finance for private equity funds (€billions Euros) 
Type of investor 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
      
Corporate investors 2209 1896 1205 1646 3959 
Private individuals 2506 1571 804 1778 2588 
Government agencies 2282 2894 1727 1442 1410 
Banks 9189 6845 5436 5091 17908 
Pension funds 10231 4253 4922 4534 14926 
Insurance companies 4700 3588 2214 2812 7165 
Fund of funds 4645 3413 4154 3164 3430 
Academic institutions 823 428 385 346 290 
Capital markets 198 38 85 506 996 
Other n/k 1425 1110 4379 2166 4409 
      
Sub-total: new funds 38210 26036 25311 23486 57081 
Realised capital gains 1802 1497 1709 3965 2462 
      
Total funds raised 40012 27533 27020 27451 59543 
Source: 2005 record year for European private Equity Thomsons/EVCA/PCW 16 March 2006  
http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_8_art_190_att_935.pdf  and Annex 1 
http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_8_art_190_att_936.pdf 
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2.4. Size of funds 
PE funds are becoming so large that they are capable of buying even the largest companies in the world. 
According to one estimate in May 2006, there were only 200 companies globally that were too big to become 
the target of a private equity syndicate, and this number is rapidly shrinking as fund sizes continue to rise. 4  
In 2005, eight funds were opened which aimed to raise more than $5bn, compared with just one $5bn-plus 
fund for the whole of 2004.5 Performance so far suggests that the very large funds do not produce better 
profits, however. 
Table 4.  Size of funds and rate of return 
Size of funds Return on funds (IRR) 
<250m. 11.5 
250-500m 17.1 
500m-1000m 21.8 
>1000m 3.8 
Source: TVE/EVCA European Benchmark performance Statistics 2006 Fig. 6  
www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_109_att_774.pdf  
2.5. Types of funds: venture capital, buyouts, infrastructure funds, hedge funds 
PE firms use different types of funds for their investments. There are four main categories: venture capital, 
buyouts, infrastructure funds, and hedge funds. Most PE firms have funds in a number of different 
categories, and so the same firm may operate venture capital, buyout, and infrastructure funds. The different 
types of funds may also draw money from the same sources – pension funds, rich individuals etc.  
 
 Venture capital 
These funds invest in new companies, and the investment is regarded as ‗venture capital‘ because it takes a 
risk on less established companies. Profits are made from the dividends of the companies but, more 
importantly, from selling the company to new owners at a profit after a few years. Venture capital funds are 
not interested in established companies, but may provide the financial support for new companies to compete 
for business in public services, such as healthcare. 
 Buyouts 
PE funds are now mostly invested in buyouts of existing companies. These existing companies may already 
be private, or they may be public, in which case the buyout normally leads to the newly acquired company 
being taken off the stock market, and so made private.  As with venture capital funds, profits are made from 
the dividends but also from selling the company to new owners at a profit after a few years, either through an 
‗initial public offering‘ (IPO) or a sale – the ‗exit‘.  Established companies are likely to be targets for 
buyouts, and so buyouts are the most important category in terms of the impact on existing public service 
operators. 
 Infrastructure funds 
More recently, a number of funds have been set up specifically to buy stakes in companies operating in 
infrastructure – including utilities such as water, electricity, and gas, but also toll roads, ports, airports. These 
funds expect long-term steady returns, and so are less likely to seek a short-term ‗exit‘ by selling the 
company. Utilities and other companies operating regulated public services may be targeted by infrastructure 
funds or by the ―buyout‖ funds of the various firms.  
 Hedge funds 
Hedge funds are investment vehicles set up to make any kind of investment in search for short-term profits 
better than could be achieved by just investing in the stock market investments. The risks and complexities 
of their strategies mean that hedge funds are more volatile than other investors, but less likely to buy 
companies in long-term regulated sectors like utilities.   
 
Table 5.  Venture and buyouts as % of target for new PE funds 
Expected destination of 
funds raised during 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Venture capital 37.6 31.0 22.4 31.9 21.2 
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Buyouts 58.3 66.3 76.5 64.8 76.6 
Other 4.1 2.7 1.1 3.3 2.1 
 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: 2005 record year for European private Equity Thomsons/EVCA/PCW 16 March 2006  
http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_8_art_190_att_935.pdf  and Annex 1  
 
2.6. Buyout targets: listed companies, privatisations, PPPs, family businesses, spin-offs, 
secondary buyouts  
Buyouts are now the major activity of PE firms. There are six different types of companies which may be 
targeted by PE funded buyouts.  
 
 Listed companies 
The first category is companies which are currently listed on stock exchanges. For example, the Danish 
services multinational, ISS, was taken over by PE funds in 2005.  This type of PE investment converts 
companies from public, listed companies into private ones, which involves a loss of information as the firms 
are no longer subject to the disclosure rules of the stock exchange. The chart shows how the impact of this 
category of investment has grown rapidly in recent years. 
Chart A. Public listed companies made private as a result of PE buyouts 
 
 
 
 Privatised companies 
The second category is companies being sold by governments or municipalities as part of a privatization 
programme. PE funds became involved in privatizations because the sale of a state- or municipally-owned 
company is a special case of a buyout of an existing company.  Even if a privatised company is initially sold 
to investors on the stock market through an IPO (initial public offering), or to an established company 
already operating in the same sector, it may later be sold on to a PE fund.   
 
PE funds are increasingly important buyers of privatised companies in Europe. In the first half of 2006, 
―private equity investors purchased €7 billion of the €22 billion worth of assets sold by European  
governments‖.6  These deals included the sale of 4.5% of Deutsche Telekom to Blackstone; the purchase of 
Dresden‘s housing company Woba Dresden, by a USA fund, Fortress; and the purchase of Rotterdam‘s 
waste company AVR by the PE funds CVC and KKR.  
 
PE funds were also involved in large privatisations in 2005, including Macquarie Bank‘s partnership with 
Eiffage to buy one of the French motorway groups; Italian telecoms company Wind was bought from Enel 
by the Weather consortium, which did not include PE funds but was backed by major banks - ABN Amro, 
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Deutsche Bank and Sanpaolo IMI - which have to borrow large sums to finance the purchase, in line with the 
PE buyout model. 7 
 
A recent FT article identified the potential for further privatization as a key issue for PE buyout investment 
opportunities:  
―Another important source of demand for private equity will be the privatisation of state-owned assets. 
…With state-owned assets of approximately €700bn privatised in Europe over the last 30 years, the key 
question is: how much is left? EU governments still hold direct and indirect stakes worth almost €300bn, 
mostly in France, Germany and Italy. However, the actual privatisation potential is substantially larger if 
one takes into account wholly- owned state enterprises as well as public infrastructure. …. More than 
half appear to be unsuited to private equity because their performance or public ownership structure 
makes them difficult to acquire. However, research by McKinsey, the management consultancy, suggests 
that the remainder is still big enough to provide the private equity industry with plenty of growth.‖ 8 
 
 Public private partnerships (PPPs), including PFI 
Public private partnerships (PPPs) are a specific form of privatisation which usually creates a company with 
the right to a long-term stream of revenue from the state, or a monopoly license. PE funds have invested in 
these companies, usually as the financial partner in a joint venture with a construction company and/or an 
operating company, especially in the UK‘s private finance initiative (PFI)  
 
 Family business 
The third category is family-owned businesses.  On average, about 1 in 5 buyouts target these companies; in 
Europe, there have been over 2,250 such deals since the 1990s, and in some years they have accounted for 1 
in 3 buyouts. 9  This category is of particular relevance in the waste management sector, where a number of 
leading operators are family-owned, for example Rethmann in Germany and Van Gansewinkel in the 
Netherlands. 
 
 Non-core spin-offs 
The fourth category is where larger groups are selling ‗non-core‘ parts of their operations. One recent 
example of this is the sale of the car-owners‘ service company Automobile Association, by Centrica, the UK 
energy group. 
 
 Sales by other PE funds (“secondary buyouts”) 
The final category is of companies owned by other PE funds. Funds expect to realise their profits by selling 
the companies they have bought to new owners, but if there are too many such companies being sold, or not 
enough demand, then the funds may sell to each other.  For example, in 2006, PE fund Terra Firma sold 
Sutton and East Surrey Water to Aqueduct, a fund run by Deutsche Bank. 
2.7. Partial shareholdings 
Investment by PE funds in existing companies has normally taken the form of 100% buyouts, so the fund 
becomes the sole owner of the target company. However, the funds have also begun to buy stakes of less 
than 100% in companies, so they become joint owners alongside others, with the target companies 
themselves remaining listed.  
 
Some of these investments are minority stakes in public service companies whose major shareholder is still 
the government. Blackstone own 4.5% of the shares of Deutsche Telekom, which remains a listed company, 
whose largest shareholder is still the German government with 32%.10  CVC has bought 22% of the shares of 
Post Danmark, while the Danish government retains ownership of 75%.11  
 
Investments in PPPs may involve the PE firm as one member of a consortium. For example the PE company 
3i holds 25% in Octagon Healthcare, a PFI company running a new hospital in Norwich, UK, with the other 
shares owned by other partners including a construction company and a facilities management company (see 
below). Another example of this kind of partnership was the consortium of Blackstone, Providence Private 
Equity and France Telecom which bid for a 51% stake in Cesky Telekom, the Czech republic‘s phone 
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company (the bid was not successful).12 Blackstone states that one-third of its investments involve an 
industrial partner.  
 
Finally, PE firms may form joint ventures with each other to buy a company. Examples of this include: the 
partnership between the PE firms CVC and KKR as joint owners of the Netherlands waste management 
company AVR (see below); and the ownership of the USA company, Healthmarkets, by a consortium of the 
Blackstone Group, Goldman Sachs Capital Partners and DLJ Merchant Banking Partners. 
2.8. Exits 
The buyout funds usually need an ‗exit‘ to realise the return on investment. Exits may be of three types: 
companies may be refloated on the stock exchange through an ‗initial public offering‘ (IPO); or sold to other 
PE funds, a process known as a ‗secondary buyout‘ ; or sold to stock exchange listed companies.  
 
In practice, very few are IPOs (only 105 out of 5,917 exits by European PE funds in 2004 – less than 2%).  
One example was the IPO in July 2006 of Southern Cross Healthcare by Blackstone as a way of realising its 
investment. 13  
 
Secondary buyouts—in which one private equity owner acquires an asset from another—form an 
increasingly popular exit option. Dealogic reports that from 2003 to 2004, the total value of secondary 
buyouts in the US rose from US$6.3bn to US$21bn. In the UK, Barclays Private Equity estimates that 
secondary buyouts now account for 40% of the total value of the buyout market, compared with 5% in 
2001.14 One recent example was when Montagu sold a shipping company to Macquarie Bank. 15 
 
Exit sales to industrial companies are also occurring. For example, in 2006 PE fund Terra Firma sold its UK 
waste company, Waste Recycling group, to the Spanish waste management and water group FCC16. This 
kind of exit is a reversal of the trend towards PE buyouts. 
  
2.9. Profitability and commissions 
PE funds have performed better than the stock market overall, and so it is believed that they are able to 
generate returns independent of general economic trends. One big investor in PE funds, the Yale University 
endowment fund, is quoted as believing that PE funds can ―generate incremental returns independent of how 
the broader markets were performing.‖ 
 
A recent empirical study found that, despite their higher levels of return, the profits of the funds are closely 
linked to general economic trends, including GDP and overall stock market returns.  This is not surprising, 
given that the funds rely on selling their investments to make a return.  It found that ―Performance 
significantly increases with the average GDP growth rate and decreases with both the average level of 
corporate bond yields and average credit spreads‖ and concluded that: ―in reality, the performance of private 
equity funds is highly pro-cyclical as it positively co-varies with the business cycles and the stock market‖17. 
 
This is reflected in the fact that the profitability of PE funds varies over time, and between types of 
investment.  One reason for the shift from venture to buyouts is simply the greater profitability of buyouts, as 
shown in the table below for all funds up to and including 2005: buyouts are twice as profitable as venture 
start-ups.   
Table 6.  Average annual rate of return for PE funds  
 % % % 
 1980-1989 1990-1995 1996-2003 
Venture 8.0 14.3 -2.1 
Buyout 12.8 20.2 6.0 
All PE 9.8 17.6 3.6 
Source: TVE/EVCA European Benchmark performance Statistics 2006 Fig. 7 
www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_109_att_774.pdf  
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Rate of return = IRR = annualized compound rate of return from monthly cash flows inc final clash flow from exit sale. 
 
2.10. PE fund activity in different countries 
PE funds have made most of their acquisitions in the USA, then the UK. In the UK, this activity represents 
more than 1% of GDP: even in the USA this proportion is only 0.6% of GDP, elsewhere the figure is much 
lower. Apax argue that the variation is due to the favourability of the regulatory frameworks; capital 
structures in each country – e.g. whether there are major pension funds- the extent of ‗entrepreneurial 
culture‘; and also ‗restrictive labour laws‘, which presumably indicates that PE funds are more attracted by 
investments in countries where it is easier and cheaper to shed labour. 18 
Chart B. Private equity activity in different countries, 2003/2004 
 
 
 
2.11. Developing countries and public sector funds 
 
PE firms are still much less active in developing countries. So far they have failed to make adequate profits, 
with an average return of only 3% in developing countries (compared with nearly 14% in USA and 11% in 
Europe). PE firms are only investing in Asia at present, where $10.5 billion was invested in 2005, but profits 
have already been made: Warburg Pincus made a return of nearly 4 times its original investment of $300m. 
in the Indian company Bahti; Carlyle made a return of over 3 times its investment of $171m. in Taiwan 
Broadband, which it sold on to Macquarie for $888m. in 2005. By comparison, PE firms invested only $1 
billion in Latin America and nothing at all in Africa, the Middle East, or former Soviet Union: a survey 
indicated that PE firms would expect returns of 26% before investing in Africa. 19  
 
Surprisingly, some public sector financial organisations operate as equity investors and promoters of PE 
funds in transition and developing countries.  
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), wholly owned by the member states of 
the EU, is one example. Originally created as a development bank to finance former communist states in 
transition, it has taken significant equity stakes in some companies – such as the private water companies in 
Tallinn (Estonia) and Sofia (Bulgaria) - and is also a leading promoter of private equity funds in Eastern 
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Europe and former Soviet Union countries. In 2005 the EBRD itself made returns of 82% on its PE 
investments, and was ―the leading private equity investor in former communist states‖. 20 
 
The CDC, formerly the Commonwealth Development Corporation, is wholly owned by the UK government, 
it operates as a PE investor in developing countries, running a number of funds. Through its subsidiary 
Globeleq it is one of the few international companies still active in privatisations of electricity companies in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. 21 
 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is a division of the World Bank which is dedicated to making 
equity investments in private companies in developing countries, although the IFC itself always takes 
minority stakes. It also invests in and encourages private equity funds, and created an association to promote 
this activity, the the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA).22  
 
There are also some much older firms which survive from the colonial era, which share some features with 
PE firms. One example is the Jardine Matheson Group, founded in 1832, which invested in trading between 
Britain and China - exporting opium to China in exchange for tea – and financed much of the expansion of 
Hong Kong. In 2006 Jardine Matheson became 49% owners of the Jakarta water concession of Suez. 
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3. Sectors 
PE investors have invested in companies in all sectors of the economy. These include manufacturing and 
private services as well as infrastructure and public services. The larger PE funds have investments in 
companies which operate in completely unconnected sectors.  This section concentrates on some recent 
investments in three main public service areas: water, waste management, and healthcare and social care – 
but it should not be assumed that the PE funds concentrate in these sectors.  
3.1. Water 
Table 7.  Water companies in EU bought by PE funds/financial investors 2003-2006 
Country Company Date Bought by PE 
investor 
%  Comment 
Czech 
republic 
SMVAK 2004 Penta 98 Sold by Anglian. Penta sell on to 
Aqualia/FCC in 2006.  
Estonia, 
Bulgaria
,  
Poland 
IWL/United 
Utilities Europe 
2003 EBRD 25 Sold by Bechtel and Edison: EBRD buys 
equity stake and loans money to UU to 
buy the remaining equity 
France  SAUR Dec 2004 PAI (Paribas) 100 Bouygues retained African and Italian 
operations 
UK Sutton and East 
Surrey Water  
plc (SES) 
Mar 2006 Aqueduct 
Capital 
/Deutsche Bank 
100 Bought holding company East Surrey 
Holdings Group (ESH) for £189m from 
Kellen Acquisitions Ltd – part of Terra 
Firma. Kellen had bought ESH only in 
October 2005, and then sold off gas 
companies.  
UK Portsmouth Water 
Ltd 
Feb 2005 Secondary 
Market 
Infrastructure 
Fund UK 
36 Bought stake in South Downs Capital Ltd, 
the ultimate holding company  
UK Mid Kent Water 
(and ? South East 
Water) 
Feb 2005, 
October 
2006 
Hastings 
Diversified 
Utilities/ 
Westpac/HFM 
50 Bought Swan Group, the holding company 
of Mid Kent Water. Swan also owns 51% 
of Halcrow water Services. Bought South 
east water from Macquarie in October 
2006, subject to approval. 
UK South 
Staffordshire 
Nov 2004 AquaInvest 
Acquisitions/ 
Arcapita Bank * 
100 Bought for £142m.  
UK Thames Water October 
2006 
Macquarie 100 Macquarie sold South East Water, which it 
had bought in 2003 from SAUR 
*formerly known as First Islamic Investment Bank 
 
Since 2002 many multinational companies have been seeking to sell their water supply operations. Because 
of a lack of buyers in the industry, many of these water companies have been (or are in the process of being) 
sold to PE funds. 
 
 The German energy multinational RWE sold Thames Water in October 2006 to Macquarie 
Infrastructure.23 In the lead up to the sale, RWE announced that the workforce of Thames would be 
cut by 15% - 1500 jobs – by 2010. 24 
 
 The French construction multinational Bouygues sold its water and waste subsidiary SAUR in 
December 2004 to a PE investor, PAI, a subsidiary of the French merchant bank Paribas. The only 
other bidders were also PE companies. 
 
 
 In 2003 the USA construction multinational, Bechtel, sold its stake in privatised water ventures in 
Europe to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). While EBRD is a 
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development bank rather than a PE fund this investment was a similar operation, whereby ownership 
was transferred to a financial investor. 
 
 In 2004 Anglian Water Group (AWG) sold their shares in the Czech water company SMVAK to a 
Czech private equity group, Penta. In April 2006 Penta sold SMVAK on to Aqualia, the water 
division of the Spanish construction and infrastructure services group FCC.  
 
 In November 2006 AWG themselves were the subject of a takeover bid by a PE consortium Osprey,  
consisting of Canada Pension Investment Board; Colonial First State Global Asset Management, a 
division of Commonwealth Bank of Australia; Industry Funds Management; and 3i Group  25 
 
PE funds have also developed an increasingly strong presence in water in the UK, especially with the smaller 
‗water-only‘ companies.  Again, this reflects decisions by the water multinationals to reduce their ownership 
of shares in UK water companies. In 2006 Veolia announced it would sell its stake in Southern Water to a 
financial investor, the Royal Bank of Scotland (an apparent exception to this trend is the bid by Aguas de 
Barcelona to buy Bristol Water).  
3.2. Waste management 
Table 8.  Waste management companies in EU bought by PE funds, 1999-2005 
Country Company Date Bought by PE 
investor 
%  Comment 
France Seche-Environnement 1999 Apax 100  
Germany Sulo 2004 Apax, 
Blackstone 
100 50% bought by each fund 
Germany, Austria, 
Sweden, Switzerland, 
Baltics 
Cleanaway Germany Oct 2005 Sulo 
(Blackstone 
Group, Apax) 
100 Sulo was bought by Apax and 
Blackstone in 2004. 
Netherlands  AVR Dec 2005 CVC Capital 
Partners, KKR, 
ONG 
100 Sold by municipality of Rotterdam. 
Netherlands Essent Jan 2005 ING/De 
Raekt/Van 
Gansewinkel 
45 Sold by municipal utility Essent.  
UK Cory Environmental 2005 Montagu PE   
UK Shanks 2004 Terra Firma 100  
UK WRG (Waste 
Recycling Group) 
2003 Terra Firma 100 Sold in 2006 to Spanish waste 
group FCC  
 
Waste management has become a popular sector for PE firms, in a number of countries in Europe. 26 
 
The Dutch municipal utility Essent formerly held 45% of the shares of Van Gansewinkel, which is active in 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Portugal, Czech Republic and Poland. In January 2005 this stake was bought 
by the Dutch financial group ING and venture capital firm De Raekt, for an undisclosed sum.  De Raekt was 
acting for the private owner, Van Gansewinkel, who now owns 80% of the company directly and indirectly.    
 
In December 2005 a consortium of private finance investors CVC Capital Partners (CVC), Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR) and Oranje-Nassau Groep B.V. (ONG) agreed to buy all the shares in AVR 
from the municipality of Rotterdam.  
 
In October 2005 Cleanaway Germany was bought by the Sulo Group. The purchase also covers Cleanaway‘s 
activities in Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and the Baltic States. The Sulo Group already owns a waste 
operation, Altvater.  Sulo itself has been owned by the Blackstone Group and Apax Partners since 2004. 
 
In October 2005 Montagu Private Equity led a management buyout of Cory Environmental, from the 
logistics group Exel. Montagu stated that ―Montagu was attracted to Cory because of its contracted revenue 
streams, well-placed landfill sites and its very experienced and highly regarded management team. 
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Montagu‘s early identification of this opportunity, our longstanding relationship with the management team 
and open dialogue with the vendor throughout the process, were all key to our success in this transaction.‖ 27  
 
In 2003 Terra Firma bought the Waste Recycling Group (WRG), and subsequently also bought the landfill 
business of Shanks – both UK waste management companies. It now claims to be the largest supplier of 
waste to energy in Europe. In May 2006 however Terra Firma sold WRG to the Spanish industrial group 
FCC (whose water division, Aqualia, has also bought water operations from a PE firm in Czech Republic – 
see above)28 
3.3. Energy 
PE funds investments in the energy sector so far consist mainly of investments in gas or electricity 
distribution networks. Electricity and gas distribution network companies are utilities where long-term, 
reliable income can be obtained from a regulated environment, and so may be particularly attractive to 
infrastructure funds.  An energy conference in 2005 noted that ―These investment funds… are attracted by 
the stable, index-linked regulated cash streams, long-term interest rates of 3-4%, cash yields of 9-10% and 
internal rates of return on capital of 14-16% enjoyed by these network businesses:‖29  
 
In most cases the buyouts have included PE firms as partners in a consortium in conjunction with other funds 
or operators, although CVC has completely bought a transmission grid in Spain, as well as the metering 
subsidiaries from E.on. In 2005, Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund bought a 49% stake in NRE 
Holding, a Netherlands-based operator of gas and electricity distribution networks, and the UK National Grid 
Transco sold three gas distribution network companies.30 
Table 9.  Energy companies in EU bought by PE funds  
Country Company Date Bought by PE 
investor 
Comment 
Bulgaria EDC Varna, EDC Gorna 
Oriahovitsa 
2005 EBRD,  E.on “The Bank’s stake will support the privatisation 
of the electricity distribution sector in Bulgaria” 
Netherlands NRE Holding  Macquarie 
Infrastructure 
49%. Gas and electricity distribution network 
UK Kellen Ventures 2005 Terra Firma Also takeover of  Centrica gas connection 
business 
UK  Wales & West Utilities 2004 Macquarie 
Infrastructure 
31.00% 
UK, France, 
Sweden 
Energy Power Resources 2004 Macquarie 
Infrastructure 
 Wind-farms 
Spain Inalta 2002 CVC  Transmission grid 
Germany Ista  2003, 
2005 
CVC  Meter services. CVC bought Viterra from E.on 
in 2003, then Ruhrgas Industries, also from 
E.on, in 2005: both are meter companies, 
merged by CVC into Ista 
 
3.4. Healthcare and social care 
PE firms have invested in health and social care activities in the UK, France, Sweden and Denmark. 31 The 
companies purchased include private hospital operators, care home operators, and companies which provide 
support services or technical services to public healthcare systems.  
 
Healthcare is an important sector for PE firms in the USA and internationally. In July 2006 a consortium of 
three funds - Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Bain Capital and Merrill Lynch – paid $33 billion for HCA, the 
biggest private hospital company in the USA. 32  
 
The activity of PE firms in this sector is illustrated by the case of Capio, which was created as a venture 
capital startup by a Swedish PE firm in the 1990s. It was then floated on the stock exchange and became an 
independent company. In 2006 it was taken over in a buyout by PE firms Apax and Nordic Capital.  
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Table 10.  Healthcare and social care companies in EU bought by PE funds  
Country Company Date Bought by PE investor Comment 
Denmark ISS 2005 Goldman Sachs and others Capital Partners and EQT 
France  Medica 2003 Bridgepoint  23% 
France Vedici 2006 Apax Six private hospitals, employing 
800 people 
Sweden  Attendo 2005 Bridgepoint   
Sweden Capio 2006 Apax, Nordic Capital  
Sweden Mölnlycke Health Care 2005 Apax  
UK  Alliance Medical 2001 Bridgepoint   
UK Ashbourne care Homes 2005 Southern Cross (Blackstone 
Group) 
Blackstone bought Southern Cross 
Healthcare in 2004 
UK  
Clinical Assessment 
Services (CAS) 2005 Bridgepoint  
 
UK  Firstpoint Healthcare 2000 Bridgepoint   
UK General Healthcare Group 
Limited (GHG).  
2006 Apax and others  Network Healthcare Holdings has 
50.1% 
UK  Match Group 1999 Bridgepoint   
UK Medisys (MDY) 2006 3i  
UK  Tunstall 2005 Bridgepoint  minority<50 
 
3.5. Other public infrastructure or public services 
PE groups have also been investing in a range of other sectors which include public services or 
infrastructure which has been recently privatised. Another example was the purchase by Carlyle Group of a 
minority stake in the defence research agency Qinetiq in the UK in 2001. Carlyle realised a substantial 
profit on this investment when Qinetiq was floated in an IPO in 2006.  
Table 11.  PE buyouts in other public infrastructure or services (examples) 
Sector Country Company PE firm   
Housing UK Annington Homes Terra Firma 1996   
Housing Germany Deutsche Annington Terra Firma 2000   
Housing Germany Viterra Terra Firma 2005   
Outsourcing   HBS Terra Firma 2000   
Post Belgium Belgian Post CVC 2005 50% 
Post Denmark Post Danmark CVC 2005 25% 
Roads France Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-Rhône (APRR) Macquarie Infrastructure 2005    
Transport Sweden Arlanda Express Macquarie Infrastructure     
Transport Belgium Brussels International Airport Macquarie Infrastructure   80% 
 
3.6. PFI  
The private finance initiative (PFI) in the UK has created a number of private entities which have 
concessions to build and maintain public infrastructure including hospitals and schools. These projects have 
attracted widespread criticism for their impact in reducing facilities and services and threatening jobs. PE 
funds have invested in many of these schemes, taking advantage of the fact that PFI projects are long-term 
public sector infrastructure with implicit guarantees from government.  
 
 For example, Barclays Private Equity, together with other financial groups including 3i, has been involved 
in a number of such PFI schemes in healthcare and social care. However, the impact of their investments has 
led to strong public criticism. A 2006 report by a parliamentary committee denounced a PFI scheme for a 
hospital in Norwich, which involved Barclays and 3i:   
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―BARCLAYS Bank and top venture capital house 3i fleeced the taxpayer of tens of millions of 
pounds, "lining their own pockets" in the construction of a flagship Private Finance Initiative 
hospital, a powerful committee of MPs said today.   Labelling them the "unacceptable face of 
capitalism", Edward Leigh chairman of the Commons Public Accounts Committee said the 
consortium which financed and built the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital - Barclays, 3i, and their 
partners Innisfree, John Laing and Serco - had bamboozled inexperienced executives at the local 
National Health Service Trust.  With the NHS said to be nearly bust, the MPs' report into the £590 
million PFI hospital reveals the extent to which private-sector financiers have milked the massive 
Government spending on health.  The report found that the consortium trading as Octagon 
Healthcare and headed by Richard Jewson, the multimillionaire heir to the Jewson family timber 
fortune, geared up the hospital project's borrowing in 2003 from Pounds 200 million to Pounds 306 
million in a bid to make refinancing gains of Pounds 116 million. Of that, Pounds 82 million 
cascaded back to the consortium, helping the partners increase the rate of returns on their 
investments from under 20% to 60%.  "The refinancing of the Norfolk and Norwich project lined the 
pockets of the investors in Octagon," said Leigh.  "This was a poor deal in which the NHS Trust 
might now have to pay Pounds 257 million if it needs to terminate the contracts early.  "This is 
taxpayers' money and the risk of this large liability was incurred essentially so that investors could 
have fatter returns.  "We believe this to be the unacceptable face of capitalism, with such a face 
shown by this private sector consortium in its dealing with the public sector."  Barclays and 3i, who 
each hold 25% of Octagon, declined to comment, as did Jewson, its chairman and a pillar of the local 
establishment as Lord Lieutenant of Norfolk and a Pro-Chancellor of the University of East Anglia.  
While 3i, a giant of the venture capital industry, has had limited involvement in PFI hospitals, 
Barclays Private Equity has been highly active in the healthcare bonanza with a string of investments 
including the new Dartford & Gravesham and Bromley hospitals and elderly care homes in Ealing.  
Low-profile City finance house Innisfree - which has another 25% of Octagon - has one of the 
biggest reputations as a specialist PFI investor.  It is a partner with John Laing in the consortium that 
was named as preferred bidder for the Pounds 1 billion Barts Hospital PFI.  Laing, whose PFI 
investment success has helped it win a strong stock market following, holds 20% of Octagon.  Serco, 
the fifth member of the consortium, is one of the Government's favourite outsourcing groups, 
running dozens of prison, railway, education and defence contracts.‖ 33 
 
More information on PFI can be found on the Unison website at http://www.unison.org.uk/pfi/, and at  
http://www.unison.org.uk/positivelypublic/ppbriefing.asp  
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4. Issues 
4.1. Information 
Companies taken over by PE are no longer listed on stock markets and so no longer have the same reporting 
obligations. It becomes more difficult to find information on the activities, except the relatively low level of 
data held in national company registration systems.   
 
For example, CVC Capital Partners is a private company, owned by its partners, not quoted on the stock 
exchange, so no published annual reports are available.  It is now formally registered as a company in the 
UK at Companies House Company No. 04726084, but the reports only started in 2004 and the data e.g. on 
sales relates only to fee income (£29.5m in 2004/5) and employees (43) of CVC itself, not the total sales of 
all its companies.   
 
So there is no information published on the collective performance of its companies. CVC publishes very 
basic data – sales, employees - on its separate subsidiaries.  The only other financial information available on 
these subsidiary companies is what they publish under their own national company registration rules, which 
they may or may not choose to publish on their websites (eg in the UK Halfords does not, Kwik-fit does). 
CVC press releases are the only way of telling if they have made a new acquisition or sale.  
 
This is part of the attraction of PE takeovers, which has been reinforced in the USA by the new stricter laws 
on information disclosure by publicly quoted companies, which were passed following the Enron scandal, 
and are known as the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.  According to the Economist, the funds are strongly against 
disclosing more information because it would expose them to short-termism: ―they are desperate to avoid 
having to disclose details about the performance of individual firms in their portfolios. Such disclosure, they 
say, would quickly subject those companies to the same sort of damaging short-term pressures that they 
would face in the public equity markets.‖ 34 The CEO of Blackstone similarly argues that: ―the same people 
managing the businesses, when freed of the tyranny of quarterly earnings and - and other types of restrictions 
that go with being a public company, know exactly what to do to create more value‖. (Stephen Schwarzman, 
CEO Blackstone, 1 May 2006)35 .  
 
Some investors have sought more information, because if the shares of companies in which a PE fund has 
invested are not publicly traded then between being bought and sold by a PE company, how can pension 
funds etc know what the value of their investment is? Thus:  
 ―Private equity firms will nevertheless face increased pressure to put more performance data in the 
public domain. Large public pension funds in the US have already faced a series of freedom of 
information suits for greater disclosure of their private equity investments. In 2002, for example, the 
San Jose Mercury News sued the California Public Employees‘ Retirement System (CalPERS), in an 
attempt to force the pension fund to disclose its private equity returns. The same year, a similar suit 
was filed against the University of Texas‘s investment fund by a Texas newspaper. In many other 
US states, similar freedom of information suits have either been filed or are pending. The result has 
been a rash of laws enacted by state legislatures that define how much public pension schemes and 
endowments must reveal about their private equity holdings. Given their inconsistency, the overall 
impact of these rulings on the US private equity industry is still unclear. In one case, a private equity 
firm expelled a state university from its new fund, rather than see performance data released for 
wider inspection. On the other hand,   an increasing number of large US public pension funds now 
publish the performance of private equity funds where they are invested.‖ 36  
 
But this increased information only applies to information about the PE funds themselves – not to the 
individual companies which they buy. Apax Partners claim that this distinction is important, and so more 
disclosure is bearable ―provided the public spotlight does not extend to individual company balance sheets. 
Making such detailed information public would undermine the whole point of taking a business private.‖ 37 
The EVCA issues guidelines, which it claims are recognised by 30 countries, based on principles for 
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investors to be able to monitor their investments in the PE funds, but not for disclosure of information about 
the target companies.38 
 
Information on companies owned by PE funds can be required by regulators of public utilities, however. The 
UK water regulator OFWAT has imposed regulatory conditions to address the information problem. In 
relation to Sutton and East Surrey water company, following its takeover by a PE fund in 2005, he has 
required the company to continue to publish the same information that it would have done if they were still 
listed, as a license condition: ―one of the licence modifications we propose requires SES to publish financial 
information as if it were listed and subject to the rules of the London Stock Exchange. SES has agreed to act 
as if this modification is already in place.‖39 
4.2. EWCs 
European Works Councils (EWCs) are important in relation to PE Funds, partly because they provide 
another instrument for forcing information disclosure, and partly because they can provide a way of bringing 
union reps from the different companies together.  Companies bought by PE funds may be eligible for EWCs 
in two ways.    
 
Firstly, each specific company may still be eligible for an EWC in the same way as it would if it was a listed 
independent company.  So for example the French water company SAUR, which operates in France, Spain 
and Poland, remains eligible for an EWC in its own right, even after its takeover by PAI.   The metering 
group Ista, formed by CVC Partners after buying Viterra and Ruhrgas Industries from E.on/Ruhrgas, is 
clearly eligible for an EWC (though none exists at present).  
 
Secondly, the PE Funds themselves are certainly eligible for EWCs.  The directive covers ―undertakings and 
groups of undertakings‖, without any restriction on whether they are private or public, industrial companies 
or finance companies, headquartered in an EU country or elsewhere.  Many PEs certainly own enough 
companies with sufficient employees in 2 or more EU countries, to qualify: and in most cases they own 
either 100%, or a controlling stake.    
4.3. Employment  
Takeovers by PE funds are normally expected to lead to job losses. In the short term, the PE fund may expect 
to increase profit margins by cutting jobs or other elements of labour costs, or relocating production to areas 
where labour is cheaper. In the long term, the extra debts loaded onto the company as a result of the takeover 
create further pressures for cost-cutting.  For example, in August 2005 a major dispute was provoked in the 
USA operations of  Celanese, when management locked out 148 workers for refusing to accept cuts to their 
health care plan, loss of 41 jobs to contract labour and a three-year wage freeze. 40  Similar cuts in jobs and 
healthcare benefits were demanded by other industrial groups in the USA at the same time, including for 
example General Motors, so this may reflect general company strategies in the USA rather than one 
particular category of owner.  
 
However, because the PE fund has no historic commitment to the company, it is less constrained by social 
and political pressures to maintain the workforce, than the historic local owners. This was illustrated in April 
2005 when Macquarie reportedly pulled out of buying Hochtief because RWE declined to sell its 9.5% stake 
after the Australian bank refused to provide job guarantees for Hochtief's 8,500 German employees. 41 This 
suggests that the possibility of major job reductions is important to such financial investors; and also that 
making employment protection a public issue can be an effective deterrence, during the period when a 
company is up for sale.  
 
Some of the problems may result from the privatization process itself rather than the type of buyer. When 
Budapest airport was put up for sale in 2005, the Hungarian unions opposed it because of concerns over job 
losses: they initially won a court case declaring the privatization illegal because of failure to consult, but this 
decision was subsequently reversed. 42  The bidders for Budapest airport included companies operating in the 
sector (BAA (UK), Fraport (France), in partnership with Deutsche Bank; a construction company, Hochtief; 
Copenhagen Airport (Denmark); and a PE fund operated by Macquarie Bank.  By the time of the final bids, 
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Macquarie had bought Copenhagen Airport and both pulled out of the bidding. The tender was won by BAA 
– which bid twice as much as either Fraport or Hochtief. The problem now faced by Budapest airport is that 
this price may be too high to be profitable, and so there is a higher probability of major job cuts. This 
employment impact was a result of the privatization process: the withdrawal of the financial bidder, 
Macquarie, did not reduce this impact.43 
 
Any form of takeover is expected to threaten cost-cutting, and it may be that with PE funds there is less risk 
of cost-cutting from ‗synergies‘, because the typical PE fund owns an incoherent set of companies, between 
whom there are no synergies. If and when PE funds begin to specialise in sectors, however,  job losses from 
such synergies may appear: for example with CVC‘s acquisition of both Viterra and Ruhrgas Industries, and 
their subsequent merger under Ista; or with Terra Firma‘s purchase of the waste companies Shanks and 
Waste Recycling Group.  
 
There is also the possibility of action by regulators to control possible employment strategies of new owners. 
In the UK water sector, the acquisition of Sutton and East Surrey Water company by a PE fund in 2005 
prompted OFWAT to show concern over possible outsourcing. OFWAT, like other regulators, had not paid 
attention to this issue in the past, but following the takeover it warned: ―There are currently no plans by 
Deutsche Bank AG to separate the ownership of SES‘s assets from their operation through substantial 
outsourcing of the company‘s functions. Should it choose to do so in the future, we might require further 
licence modifications, including modifications to ensure that the regulated business retained control of its 
outsourced functions, to enable it to meet its responsibilities as a water undertaker.‖ 44 
 
4.3.1. ECVA study: faster employment growth in buyout companies? 
The European Private Equity and Venture capital Association (EVCA) has tried to respond to these concerns 
with ―a pan-European study on the overall employment contribution of private equity and venture capital 
industry to European job creation. It examines both the current levels of employment by private equity and 
venture capital financed companies as well as the new jobs created by the industry in recent years.‖  The 
study is based on a survey of 99 buyout companies and 102 venture capital financed companies. 
(Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe. EVCA. December 2005.  
http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_129_att_953.pdf ).  The conclusions and claims made 
by the report and the EVCA appear very favourable to PE funds in respect of both buyouts and venture 
capital, until the sectoral patterns are examined.  
 
In total, it finds that 6m people are employed in PE-financed companies (of which 5m. in buyouts), 3% of 
total employment in Europe. PE-financed companies also represent 25% of the employment in the top 600 
European private companies. The ECVA study claims that 1m. new jobs were created by European PE-
financed companies between 2000 and 2004:  420,000 (net of post-purchase reductions) were in buyouts, and 
630,000 in venture-backed companies.  PE-financed buyout companies experienced employment growth of 
2.4% per annum, compared with only 0.7% across Europe as a whole in the same period, and an average 
annual decline of 0.2% in employment in the largest 6000 private companies. 45    
 
Two-thirds of buyout companies increased their employment, while one-third saw reduced employment. 
Family-owned companies increased employment most, by 7.1% per year, (which the survey suggests is 
because family firms do not capitalize on all their growth opportunities), but the category they describe as 
―turnaround‖ buyouts shows an annual average reduction in employment of 3.8%.  They also found that in 
management buyouts, employment grew by 3.1% per year, but where new management was brought in 
(which happened in only a small number of cases), employment fell by an average of 2.3% per year.  
Venture start-up companies showed the fastest employment growth, not surprisingly.46  The study references 
other research reports on Spain, France and the UK. Separate results for buyouts, excluding venture capital, 
are only given for the two UK studies, which concluded that the average annual employment growth rate in 
PE-funded buyouts in the UK was 7% or 11%. 47 
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Table 12.  EVCA claims of growth in employment in PE-funded buyout companies 
 Annual % increase in 
employment, 1997-2004 
Total % increase in employment 
2000-2004 
PE-funded buyout companies 2.4 10.1 
EU 25 total employment 0.7 0.9 
Top 600 EU private companies  -0.1 -0.2 
Source: Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe. EVCA. December 2005. Fig. 5 
 
One weakness in the study lies in the comparisons between buyout companies and other companies in the 
same sector. This sectoral comparison is important because buyouts are likely to concentrate on growth 
sectors, and so are likely to show a faster growth profile than the economy as a whole. In section 3.4 the 
study does note that the buyouts comparative performance is not better across all sectors: the report does not 
present a table, but the text allows the derivation of the table below.  This suggests that in at least some 
sectors, companies subject to buyouts do worse in employment terms than the largest listed companies in the 
sector. indeed, transportation and computing may be the only two out of ten sectors in which buyouts appear 
to do better.  
Table 13.  PE Buyouts: employment results compared with largest companies in sector   
Sector PE Buyout 
companies 
Largest EU 
companies in 
sector * 
Difference 
(+= 
buyouts 
better) 
Buyouts BETTER 
or WORSE than 
sector average 
 Employment 
growth % 
Employment 
growth % 
  
Transportation 17.3 0.6 +16.7 BETTER 
Computer-related 10.3 1.4 +8.9 BETTER 
Healthcare 6.7 ? ? ? 
Construction 5.0 ? ? ? 
Consumer-related 4.0 ? ? ? 
Manufacturing 2.7 ? ? ? 
Other services -2.3 0.6 -2.9 WORSE 
Chemicals and materials -3.0 -2.8 -0.2 WORSE 
Financial services -3.8 0.4 -4.2 WORSE 
Communications -6.3 1.3 -7.6 WORSE 
Source: text of EVCA study section 3.4   *DJ STOXX 600 companies  ? = no figure given by report. 
 
These comparisons may conceal a further problem. Within each sector, companies which are the subject of 
buyouts by PE funds are selected according to whether they can deliver sufficient growth to be worth more 
in 6 years time. This selected set of companies should therefore, in every sector, be generating faster growth 
in output and employment than others, before the PE fund bought them: if they are not, then the PE funds‘ 
own performance as selectors of growth companies would be worse than random.  Yet the data suggests that 
in many, indeed most, sectors, the buyouts are actually performing worse than average.    
 
This analysis thus leaves open the distinct possibility that the contribution of PE fund buyouts to the 
companies’ growth in employment or output may be consistently negative. The companies, if well 
selected, may have continued to exhibit faster than average growth if they had not been the subject of 
buyouts. 
4.4. Volatility of ownership 
PE funds engage in asset-stripping, reductions in employment, increases in charges to users, or extraction of 
profits from a company, with the intention of increasing its sale value when the PE fund exits. This 
behaviour has been widely observed and stems directly from the fact that PE funds rely on sales of their 
companies in order to make profits, which requires them to increase the market value of the company in the 
relatively short term.  
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Multinational industrial groups also engage in similar practices. For example, before selling Thames Water 
in 2006, the RWE group announced reductions in employment of 25% and extracted an exceptionally high 
final dividend payment. In the last two decades the great majority of these traditional companies have 
become subject to financial targets with short-term perspectives.  
 
Thomsons claim that ―the normal life cycle of private equity funds requires at least 6 years to deliver 
significant returns‖. 48 Private equity funds sell on nearly all of their investments less than 10 years after 
buying them: in most cases, after 3-6 years, in some cases even after a few months. For example, out of 34 
investments made by Montagu PE in service sector companies, only 6 remain owned by Montagu. The 
longest lasting company has been owned by Montagu PE for 9 years, since 1997; but 8 out of 13 companies 
bought since then have already been sold on. 
 
If 6 years is the length of time for which PE investors are expected to retain companies, this may not in fact 
be much less than the practice of multinational groups. In the waste sector, the USA groups Waste 
Management Inc and Browning-Ferris bought many European companies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
but had sold them all again by the end of the 1990s. In water, Veolia, SAUR, Suez - and now RWE - have all 
sold off UK water companies within 5 or 6 years of purchase. In electricity and gas, the wave of mergers in 
Europe continues, fuelled by the internal market, but in the process there have been exits and sales by some 
multinational groups, including USA groups such as Texas Utilities selling their UK and German operations.  
4.5. Illusion or sustainable growth? 
It is not certain that PE funds can continue to perform as well as they have done.  The evidence suggests that 
their profits move in line with the business cycle, and so basically reflect the same factors as company profits 
in general. The apparent success of PE funds in performing better than the overall level is usually attributed 
to them identifying companies which were undervalued by their owners. The PE fund could therefore buy 
them at a bargain price, and selling them on later at a price which reflects their real profitability. It is unlikely 
that there is an endless supply of such bargains, and so it is doubtful that the apparently superior performance 
of PE funds can continue on this basis alone.   
 
The increase in the size of funds can be seen in part as an attempt to prolong the supply of bargains by 
targeting companies that were previously too big for PE funds. But this rise in the number and size of PE 
funds may, by itself, reduce the profitability of investments in buyouts. A recent study concluded that the 
profits of PE investments in buyouts are much lower when a lot of money in PE funds are chasing the same 
targets, because the price of buyouts, especially in Europe : ―depend on the competition by a limited number 
of private equity fund managers for a limited number of attractive investment opportunities……..As capital 
commitments into buyout funds currently rise towards new peaks, investors may raise concerns about the 
expected future return to buyout fund investments.‖ 49 
 
The high level of buyouts may reflect the interests of the firms themselves. Apart from the dividends and 
capital gains which are enjoyed by all the investors in the fund, the PE firms also make profits for themselves 
by charging commissions for their work in arranging buyouts. These commissions can be very lucrative, and 
mean that the partners of the firms benefit immediately from each investment. This creates an incentive to 
maintain a constant flow of new buyouts. When Macquarie bought Thames Water in 2006, the firm paid 
itself commissions worth £60 million (€86m.). Since Macquarie only invested £250m of its own money to 
the buyout, the firm got an immediate return of 24%. According to the FT: 
 
―The business model, largely pioneered by Macquarie, is to raise third-party funds and then use them 
to arrange infrastructure investments. The bank takes fees for advising on the deal, for arranging the 
debt, and for managing the asset all while committing limited amounts of its own capital. Analysts at 
UBS estimate that Macquarie earned more than GBP60m in fees from the recent GBP8bn buyout of 
Thames Water a deal where its own equity contribution is just GBP250m. Not surprisingly, banks 
are eager to imitate this model: "Macquarie has shown us all the way," says one investment 
banker.‖50 
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A number of PE funds and commentators suggest that PE funds also create extra profits by improving the 
performance of the businesses themselves, and so their companies are more profitable because they are better 
managed.  One article suggests that ―increasing emphasis lies on improvements in the fundamental 
performance of the underlying business, and the ability of the investing buy-out company to contribute to 
such improvements‖ 51 ; one large PE firm, Apax, suggests that ―value creation will derive from active 
ownership of companies. ….Sectoral expertise, global reach, deep pockets and professional back-office 
operations will be the hallmarks of the leading private equity players‖. 52  Apax further argue that this means 
that sector specialists will do best: ―Healthcare is a good example of a sector whose potential only those 
buyout firms with deep industry expertise will capitalise on. Anyone can grasp that rising life expectancy in 
the developed world will bring increasing demand for such services as long-term care homes for the elderly. 
But it takes considerable time and analysis to master an industry landscape that is both highly regulated and 
fragmented.‖ 53 Apax also suggests that restructuring a company in the first three months after a takeover is a 
crucial, which implies a very interventionist behaviour.54   
 
However, it is not very plausible that experts in investment can improve the strategies or operations of, say, a 
waste management company. It is unclear why or how PE firms like Apax can develop credible expertise in 
managing companies in a particular sector, that would give them an advantage over an industrial group (or 
public authority) specializing in that activity. If a PE fund develops special expertise in a sector, and buys 
several companies in the same sector, it would then become more like a conventional multinational group 
with one or more industrial divisions.  
4.6. Excessive debt burden 
4.6.1. Borrowing to pay out early profits (‘leveraged recapitalisations’) 
The funds are expected to pay returns to their investors from the outset, and if a company is not immediately 
made more profitable, then the initial returns have to be found by borrowing more money to pay the initial 
investors.  This is currently made easier because there is a lot of money looking for investments, and 
investors are now prepared to lend at much higher levels of leverage than before, even though it places 
increased debt burdens on operations.  
 
According to the ratings agency Fitch, €25 billion Euros of debt was raised by leveraged buy-outs in the first 
half of [2005] alone, of which ―nearly half of that was used simply to let private equity firms pay dividends 
to their investors‖. 55 Fitch analyst Rachel Hardee was quoted as saying that "Money is coming out of these 
deals - and coming out very early, often in less than a year".  
 
This is now called ‗leveraged recapitalisations‘, described as ‗the cocaine of private equity‘ by one US buy-
out chief.  A FT article in August 2006 defined it as: 
 
―the practice whereby a private equity group does a leveraged buyout and then quickly pays itself fat 
dividends from that company, funded not by anything as humdrum as corporate cash flows but the 
issuance of yet more debt…. "recaps" have been spreading like wildfire. A chilling report from 
Standard & Poor's, the rating agency, on Monday suggested that 63 such leveraged recaps have 
occurred in the US and Europe this year [2006], funded by a staggering Dollars 25bn of debt, mostly 
bank loans…. What a recap essentially does is let a buyout group extract dividends early in the life 
of their investment. That allows the financiers to pay themselves fat bonuses (ergo flash cars, smart 
houses in the Hamptons or ski chalets in Verbier). But recaps also keep investors in private equity 
funds sweet. And this issue has recently become very important. For the initial public offering 
market has been so lacklustre in recent years that some buyout groups have struggled to produce 
profits through their "normal" strategy of restructuring companies and selling them on. Recaps have 
thus become a tempting quick-fix alternative.‖ 56 
 
The companies may not be able to sustain these returns, and so employment and the company itself may be 
at risk by the strain of the extra debt burden. The Standard and Poor‘s report ―found that default rates among 
a sample of companies that have undergone leveraged recaps - a refinancing method that allows private 
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equity groups to suck out large dividend payments by loading their portfolio companies with additional debt 
- were as high as 6 per cent‖.57 
4.6.2. Leveraged buyouts 
Official agencies in the UK, Australia and elsewhere have now expressed alarm at the possibility of company 
bankruptcies resulting from an unsupportable level of debt loaded on them by these buyouts.  
 
The UK Financial Services Agency (FSA) in November 2006 produced a report saying that it was seriously 
concerned about the possibility of a collapse of a PE buyout, because of excessive leverage, the risk of 
insider trading, and the possibility of a default.  A senior FSA official, Henry Sants, warned that: "The 
default of a large private equity-backed company is increasingly inevitable," (Such defaults would have) 
negative implications for lenders, purchases of the debt, orderly markets, and . . . elements of the UK 
economy." 58 
 
The Reserve Bank of Australia also warned in November 2006 that : ―Debt-fuelled private equity buyouts 
are making companies more vulnerable to swings in the economy ……It says that leveraged buyouts 
typically leave the company being bought with a debt to equity ratio several times higher than before the 
takeover, ''potentially making it more sensitive to economic fluctuations''.59  Authorities in the USA are 
investigating the possibility of profiteering from collusion between PE funds since 2003. 60 
 
A further report by Standard and Poors in November 2006 also warned that the quality of the debt being used 
to support the buyouts has become very weak, and so there is a much a higher risk of bankruptcies: ―at the 
end of August the loans backing three-quarters of European private-equity deals were rated in the single "B" 
range of junk debt. This means there is a one in five chance of the companies taken private using the loans as 
finance falling into default. That is a sharp decline compared with the situation at the end of 2002, when the 
agency started compiling figures: [at that time] less than one-third of debt was rated in the B range, while 57 
per cent was rated in the BB range - just below investment grade. At that level, the risk of default is just one 
in 20.‖ 61 
 
This decline in debt quality resulting from the leverage is a direct cost to the company‘s operations. In 2006 
a consortium of private equity firms bought HCA, the largest health company in the USA, for $33 billion. 
The debt involved was in the purchase was then loaded onto HCA, and ratings agency Standard & Poor's 
moved its corporate credit rating down three notches to B+ - a ‗junk‘ rating, which means HCA has to pay 
higher interest rates on all its borrowing. According to an analyst quoted in the Economist: ―HCA will pay 
$1.5 billion more interest a year as a result…This debt load handcuffs their capabilities." 62 
 
Previous collapses of financial services companies have proved very costly to the public sector. In 1975 the 
threatened collapse of Slater Walker, a financial investment company specialising in buyouts and asset-
stripping, led to the Bank of England giving the company the equivalent of $1 billion Euros of public 
money.63  
 
4.6.3. Social and economic impact  
Investors acknowledge that the short-termism of the funds is at odds with social considerations: one told the 
FT that "When we have companies controlled by people with five to seven year timeframes, it creates a 
certain amount of upheaval in the social fabric,‖; another said that "It's hard for us to make a real distinction 
between hedge funds, private equity and distressed funds."64 
 
In France there are similar concerns. The funds are criticised by unions and also by industrialists for a 
complete lack of respect for national economic interests (―sans le moindre respect du patriotisme 
économique‖), even the president of insurance group Axa, Claude Bébéar, describes their operations as 
insensitive and demands greater regulation of their activities.65  
 
Their activities also impact, through privatisations, on the social functions of operations which are privatised. 
For example many German cities have sold their social housing to private companies in order to reduce 
municipal debts.  
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
15/07/2010  Page 25 of 36  
  
―In March 2006 Dresden city council sold its entire stock of 48,000 city-owned apartments to an 
American private equity firm, the Fortress Investment Group, for $1.2 billion. In a single stroke, 
Dresden wiped out its burdensome public debt…. Affordable public housing is a pillar of the 
German welfare state, and the prospect of vast pieces of it falling into the hands of pinstriped 
financiers from New York or London has unsettled many people here. In Dresden, 45,000 of them 
signed a petition opposing the sale.   ''When a new owner is profit-oriented, it brings changes,'' said 
Peter Bartels, the chairman of the Dresden renters' association. ''We're not sure yet what kinds of 
changes. But we know there will be changes….. The tenants who opposed the sale said they feared 
that Fortress would raise rents or even throw people out on the street. They question how a private 
equity firm, with its need for hefty returns, could own public housing without squeezing the people 
who live there.  ''These investors have no social conscience whatsoever,'' said Thilo Kluge, 45, a 
tenant in a city-owned apartment who campaigned against the sale. ''They have a single interest: 
Make my bank account fatter.''………………. The residents will be protected by an agreement, 
known as the Social Charter, that Fortress had to sign to stay in the bidding. The contract limits its 
ability to raise rents -- including those that are below market rate -- and protects tenants from being 
evicted. People over 60 or with severe disabilities are guaranteed lifelong tenancy……………….  
Moreover, Fortress must hold on to 34,000 of the apartments for 10 years before it sells them. And 
when it does, it must offer existing tenants a 15 percent reduction from the market price. Finally, it 
cannot renovate the apartment complexes into luxury condominiums…………..''The rule of thumb is 
that the firms only put in 25 percent of their own money,'' Mr. Saunderson of Property Finance 
Europe said. ''The rest is bank financing. You take out your 25 percent in a few years, and you have 
a rolling program of sales. People grow old and die, or leave the apartments.''‖66 
4.7. Political lobbying for influence and subsidies 
PE funds are politically active in protecting their own operations, and have used public finance to support 
their own operations. 
 
The European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (ECVA)  was founded in 1983 to promote and 
protect the ―long-term interests‖ of the sector. It has an annual income of €6.8million. In 1993 it launched a 
private equity programme for central and eastern Europe, using public sector funding from the EU PHARE 
programme, and a similar programme in 1997 for Russia and the former Soviet Union.   
 
The ECVA has also been successful in lobbying for influence on EC policies. It describes 2005 as ―an 
extremely busy year for lobbying in terms of meetings with European Commission officials and members of 
the European Parliament……with the Help of ECVA, the EC has set up an expert group of private equity 
and venture capital professionals and advisers. This expert group will deliver a ―manifesto‖ for national and 
European policy-makers‖. 67 The ECVA also produces reports on the economic and social impact of buyouts 
(see section on employment). 
4.8. Infrastructure: longer term investments 
There is currently a high level of interest by pension funds and others in investing in infrastructure: 
―infrastructure offers stable income streams for 20 to 30 years and has an implicit link to inflation. 
Infrastructure covers a wide range of services, often only recently privatised, such as ports, airports, 
hospitals, roads, broadcast towers and transmission and other pipelines and services for utilities as well as the 
water, gas and electricity companies themselves.‖68 For pension funds especially, infrastructure is a long-
term investment like gilts (Government bonds) which give low but secure returns for 20/30 year periods, 
especially as there is a general shortage of such government bonds.  
 
Reflecting this demand, infrastructure funds have been created in recent years by a number of PE companies, 
including Macquarie Bank, Goldman Sachs, and others. These funds are interested in utilities in fields like 
water and electricity and gas precisely because they are predictable and regulated. According to a recent 
analysis in the FT, infrastructure funds use a different method of valuing a company which reflects this 
interest in long-term stable returns. Whereas PE buyouts are concerned about share prices, because they 
expect to make their return out of  capital gains from selling the company on again, the infrastructure 
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investors expect to own the company for 20 years or more, and to make their return from a reliable flow of 
annual income. As a result: 
―most infrastructure analysts pride themselves on paying little attention to the price of something in 
the public markets. Instead, they attempt to model revenues, costs, investment requirements and cash 
flows for a particular business well into the future, and then work out what those cash flows are 
worth today. The final figure gives an indication of what an asset might be worth, and how much 
debt it can support. In both cases, the answer often differs significantly from the view of the stock 
market.‖69 
This also means that infrastructure funds can afford to pay less for companies, because they can accept lower 
long-term returns. They are also under no pressure to sell rapidly: ― … Private equity groups like to sell 
assets three-to-five years after acquisition, whereas infrastructure funds can hold assets for 10 or 20 years, or 
in some cases in perpetuity….That means they can put in longer term and cheaper debt".70 
 
These funds may be more stable owners than PE funds, or multinationals. If the objective of these funds is to 
make long-term investments with steady returns in reliably essential services, matching the pension and 
insurance funds long-term liabilities with long-term assets, then there are fewer pressures for short-term 
returns. Macquarie Infrastructure Fund, for example, states that it does not plan for exits, and so far do not 
appear to have sold any of their operations. According to John Roberts, former CEO of United Utilities, now 
at PE firm Terra Firma: "The natural owners of utilities are long-term pension funds, so we shouldn't be 
surprised. It's a trend that that is going to run".71 
 
These kind of investments thus may not lead to pressure for short-term asset-stripping or cost-cutting, and 
may even involve a move to more long-term, stable low-return ownership than with multinational groups. 
Such ownership may in the long-term be much more like utilities under public ownership. In both cases, the 
great majority of capital comes from debt financing, lower rates of interest can be achieved because of the 
long-term reliable demand for essential services and the implicit government guarantee, and both investors 
and the sector have a long-term perspective.  It may therefore be useful to distinguish between this type of 
PE fund and others. 
 
Infrastructure funds are very new developments so it is not certain that their future behaviour will match 
these expectations. So far most investments by PE firms in water, energy, waste or healthcare companies 
have been through conventional buyout funds, not through infrastructure funds, and so they expect a return 
by selling on the company. For example, a consortium of four private-equity firms - the Blackstone Group, 
Hellmann & Friedman, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Texas Pacific Group – bought the electricity generating 
company Texas Genco for $900million in 2004, and a year later sold it on to the electricity group NRG 
Energy for $4billion in cash and $1.8billion in shares. 72  Water and similar shares may be bought and traded 
by financial investors looking for a quick profit , as seems to have happened in the USA, but this may just be 
short-term trading by hedge funds which fades when share prices settle at a new level.  In the USA the main 
company Aqua America yields 1.8 percent, the average yield for the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, with 
other main water companies yielding 3%.73 
4.9. Debt financing and public ownership 
In general PE purchases mean that there is more financing through debt (at fixed interest) rather than equity 
(with variable dividends). This should normally be cheaper in stable utilities and services: the UK water 
regulator, OFWAT, comments that ―debt financing has, other things being equal, been a significantly 
cheaper source of finance than equity since privatisation‖.    
 
This may make a switch to public ownership easier and cheaper: from the investors‘ point of view, the debt 
would remains at the same rate of interest, but would become government debt, which is more secure. 
 
This reflects a number of arguments and developments in recent years.  
 
 Some economists argue that the extra return given to equity capital is one reason why public 
ownership, with debt replacing expensive private equity, may be justified on a range of projects. 74   
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 Debt has been replacing equity as a source of finance for utilities and transport in developing 
countries since the 1990s. 75  
 
 Dieter Helm, a supporter of privatization, argues that the sectors can now be financed by separating 
operating costs, which should be subject to regulation and so be covered by price caps and allowed 
an equity-level rate of return, from sunk capital investment (whose cost should be totally guaranteed, 
ultimately by the taxpayer, thus allowing cheaper debt financing to be used at rates comparable with 
government long-term bonds: he also notes that an alternative, and traditional solution is public 
ownership. 76  
 
 There has been a distinct shift from equity to debt financing in the UK private water sector. The 
companies were privatised in 1989 with virtually no debt at all, and so the trend is very clear and 
remarkable.  This trend has included the withdrawal and reduction of equity investments by 
multinationals; the increased role of financial investors, including private equity funds, as 
shareholder; and generally an increased use of debt to finance investment, rather than equity.77  One 
effect of this shift is to reduce the argument for privatisation, which depends on the profit-
maximising incentive as the key driver for efficiency: if equity is replaced by debt, then the profit-
maximisation incentive disappears, as the company only has an incentive to earn enough to pay the 
interest on the debt, and so the efficiency incentives disappear.78 
 
 
 
Source:  The Development Of The Water Industry In England And Wales. Ofwat And Defra. 2006. p.96 
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/development_of_water_industry270106.pdf/$FI
LE/development_of_water_industry270106.pdf 
 
The structures that have emerged have generally contained levels of debt in the range 75 per cent to 85 per 
cent of regulatory asset value - the extreme case was the creation of Glas Cymru as the new owner of Welsh 
Water, as a company with no share capital at all, in 2001.  This shift to a high gearing affects credit ratings, 
for example when Suez sold Northumbrian water to a debt-financed buyer: ―Following the leveraged take-
over of Northumbrian Water in 2003 by Aquavit plc, the credit rating …. fell from A- to BBB+ from Fitch 
Ratings and from A- to BBB from S&P‖. However,  all the UK water companies retain credit ratings of at 
least investment grade, and often much higher, and so a very high level of debt appears . ―MIS(Moody‘s) has 
indicated that debt to regulatory asset value (RAV) levels of 95 per cent may be consistent with investment 
grade credit quality‖. The UK regulators conclude firmly that ―….There is no evidence that suggests that 
present levels of gearing for regulated energy and water businesses have lead to sub-optimal levels of 
investment‖. 79   
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
15/07/2010  Page 28 of 36  
  
 
 
5. Annex A: Selected PE funds 
5.1. Apax   
http://www.apax.com/   
Apax Partners is one of the world's largest private equity investment groups, operating across Europe, 
Israel, the United States and Japan.  Apax Partners‘ Funds invest in companies across 6 sectors: information 
technology; telecommunications; healthcare; media; financial services; retail and consumer.  
 
Apax investments in public services and utilities include: 
 In France, Seche-Environnement, acquired in 1999 
 In Germany, the Sulo Group, acquired in 2004 (50% Apax, 50% Blackstone) :  
 Apax, with Goldman Sachs and Providence, invested in Kabel Deutschland - Europe‘s 
largest cable operator - in 2003: in 2005 Apax and GS sold their holdings to Providence. 
 Apax has a special healthcare division. It invests in all aspects of the sector, including equipment and 
pharmaceuticals, but also private hospitals, including the following:  
o Vedici , France, 2006 
o General Healthcare Group Limited , United Kingdom, 2006 
o Mölnlycke Health Care , Sweden, 2005 
 
5.2. Barclays PE 
http://www.barcap.com/cgi-bin/bpe/index.pl  
Barclays private Equity (Barclays PE) is the PE operation of Barclays Bank.  It has a buyout division active 
across Europe in a range of sectors, and also an infrastructure division focussed on PFI and PPPs.  
 
Barclays PE infrastructure  activity is almost entirely in the UK so far, except for a single PPP venture in 
Cork (Republic of Ireland) in a joint venture with Hochtief.  All the UK investments are in PPPs, mostly 
under the PFI initiative.  
 
Barclays Private Equity in partnership with Societe Generale has established the Infrastructure Investors (I2) 
Fund, to buy out stakes in established PFI schemes. Barclays and Societe Generale have each committed 
£150m to the I2 Fund and in June 2005 3i committed a further £150m to take the total size of the fund to 
£450m. 
 
To date, Barclays PE has invested in 17 schools PFI projects in the UK, in conjunction with Jarvis, Vinci, 
Gleeson and Bouygues. The projects, covering 76 individual schools, include: primary, secondary, special 
needs and faith schools. BPE is also active in Building Schools for the Future (BSF), a government initiative 
for the rebuilding or renewing of every secondary school in England over a ten to fifteen year period. 
 
Barclays PE has made a number of investments in NHS PFI projects of varying size and complexity, from 
individual GP surgeries through to large Acute General Hospitals. Investments were made in five of the first 
wave of PFI hospitals, including the first hospital to be procured: the Dartford and Gravesham Hospital. All 
these facilities are now operational following completion of construction between 2001 and 2003.  
5.3. Blackstone Group 
http://www.blackstone.com/ 
Blackstone, started in 1987, is one of the leading USA private equity groups, and operates worldwide.   
Blackstone has invested over $110 billion in over 87 companies, in a range of industries, including 
manufacturing, chemicals, transportation, communications, insurance, lodging, entertainment, energy, and 
waste management. In many of its investments Blackstone has partnered with corporations including AOL 
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Time Warner (Six Flags transaction), AT&T (Bresnan transaction), Northrop Grumman, Sony, Union 
Carbide, Union Pacific (CNW transaction), USX, and Vivendi. These corporate partnerships account for 
about 51% of the equity capital invested by Blackstone. 
 
Blackstone's current holdings include  
 In energy: 
o Sithe Global Power (80%) a privately held international independent power 
development company which focuses on certain target markets in North America, 
Europe, Mexico, Africa and the Middle East. 
o Texas Genco 
 In waste management:   
o Allied Waste, 1997 (and the takeover of BFI in 1999)  
o 50% of the Sulo Group, with Apax Partners holding the other 50% (see above) 
 In water 
o Nalco 
 In healthcare 
o Southern Cross/NHP (plus Ashbourne Homes in 2005) 
5.4. Bridgepoint  
http://www.bridgepoint-capital.com   
Bridgepoint Capital is a UK based PE firm, started 25 years ago.  It specialises in healthcare. Many 
companies bought by Bridgepoint have since been sold on. Current company holdings include: 
Healthcare 
Company name Description Deal type 
Deal size 
(m) 
FTSE 
sector 
Date Location 
Turnover 
(m) 
Alliance Medical 
Private operator of diagnostic imaging 
equipment 
MBO €178 Health 2001 UK €63 
Attendo Elderly care home operator MBO €245 Health 2005 Sweden €275 
Clinical Assessment 
Services (CAS) 
Clinical decision support software provider IBO €78.5 Health 2005 UK €36 
Match Group 
Provider of flexible staffing to the 
healthcare sector 
PTP/MBO €117 Health 1999 UK €240 
Medica Leading operator of nursing homes MBO €330 Health 2003 France €207 
Tunstall 
Leading provider of personal and home 
reassurance telecare systems 
MBO €336 Health 2005 UK €103 
 
Support services 
 
Company name Description 
Deal 
type 
Deal size 
(m) 
FTSE sector Date Location 
Turnover 
(m) 
Digica 
IT infrastructure and services outsourcing 
business 
MBO €38 
Support 
Services 
2001 UK €16 
ERM Environmental consultancy services MBO €446 
Support 
Services 
2005 UK €410 
Firstpoint 
Healthcare 
Flexible staffing agency MBO €48 
Support 
Services 
2000 UK €38 
IPS Resourcing Flexible staffing solution MBO n/d 
Support 
Services 
2001 UK €15m 
Management 2000 Temporary staffing agency MBO €25 
Support 
Services 
2000 Germany €40 
Mory Parcel delivery company MBO €123 
Support 
Services 
1999 France €760 
NES Group Provider of contract technical and IT MBO €83 Support 1999 UK €200 
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Company name Description 
Deal 
type 
Deal size 
(m) 
FTSE sector Date Location 
Turnover 
(m) 
personnel Services 
 
 
5.5. CVC 
www.cvc.com/ 
The company was set in 1981 as Citicorp‘s European private equity arm, and in 1993 it became independent 
through its own management buy-out.  According to the company ―Since 1981, CVC has acquired over 220 
companies in Europe for a total consideration of more than €61.9 billion [some have since been sold, so…]. 
CVC's current European portfolio of 38 companies has a combined transaction size of over €32.2 billion.‖         
 
CVC operates across all sectors, and services and utilities are only a small part of their holdings.  They 
include Formula One racing group, the UK‘s Automobile Association (bought from energy company 
Centrica), and various manufacturing companies. They have now sold a number of public service operations 
which they bought in the past. For example, in 1996 they bought a previously privatized road construction 
agency in the UK, but sold it on a few years later.  In 1998 they bought a Spanish healthcare company, 
Iberica De Diagnostico Y Cirugia, which has since been sold on (To Capio). They have no holdings in water, 
although they twice bid for SAUR water operations (in UK 2003, France 2004).  
 
The current investments in the utilities and public services area include: 
 Ista (Formerly Viterra Energy Services) – heat, water and electricity meters. 3,700 employees 
Bought from E.on in 2003 (formerly known as Viterra) 
 Ruhrgas Industries – also gas heat, water, and electricity meters: also bought from E.on (in 2005 – 
―the largest cross-border gas deal last year was the $1.8bn purchase of E.On's Ruhrgas metering 
business by the UK private equity investors CVC Capital Partners.‖ 80) 
 Inalta - Infraestructuras de Alta Tension (Inalta) owns and manages a high-voltage electricity 
transmission network in Spain. Bought from Iberdrola in 2002.  
 Post Danmark (25%) and Belgian Post (50-50 partnership with Post Danmark, itself 25% owned by 
CVC) – the Danish and Belgian states retain the rest of the shares.   Both holdings acquired in 2005. 
 
5.6. KKR 
www.kkr.com 
Since its founding in 1976, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.(KKR) has completed more than 130 transactions 
involving in excess of $162 billion of total financing, including: 
 Two of the largest buyout transactions ever (RJR Nabisco, 1989, $31.4B; Beatrice, 1986, $8.7B) 
 The largest leveraged buyout ever in France (Legrand, 2002, €4.94B) 
 The use of private equity in industries such as banking, insurance, utilities, and heathcare  
 
In 2003 KKR bought control of a USA electricity transmission company ITC Holdings, which owns a 
network of 2,700 miles of electricity transmission lines that interconnect generating stations serving 
approximately 4.9 million customers. 
 
In 2006 a consortium led by KKR and CVC bought 100% of the share capital in AVR for €1.4 billion from 
the municipality of Rotterdam. AVR is the largest waste management company in the Netherlands with an 
annual total turnover of more than €500 million, over 4 million tons of processed waste and approximately 
2,100 employees. AVR also holds leading positions in domestic collection, recycling and separation of 
waste.  
5.7. Macquarie 
http://www.macquarie.com/  
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Maquarie Bank (Australia) invests in a range of sectors, through a range of funds including non-
infrastructure funds, and has been criticised in Australia for being too short-term and demanding in its 
strategies with companies it has bought.  Macquarie is also involved in advice and consultancy for a range of 
PPPs, off-balance sheet financing, cross-borderleasing, etc.  
 
Macquarie invests in infrastructure worldwide. It has a set of listed and unlisted investment vehicles 
specialising in infrastructure, ―which offer both private and institutional investors the opportunity to access 
new and existing infrastructure assets‖. It says it invests for ―sustainable cash yields and moderate capital 
growth‖.  The Macquarie Group has around 90 investments in 20 countries.  
 
The Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund was launched in April 2004 to target investments in 
infrastructure and related assets located in European OECD countries: ―The Fund aims to deliver sustainable 
cash yields and moderate capital growth from investment in a diversified portfolio of quality infrastructure 
assets. It invests in assets that provide essential services to the community, have a strategic competitive 
advantage and provide sustainable and predictable cashflows. Established in April 2004, MEIF is targeted at 
pension funds and other institutional investors seeking long-term stable returns matching their long-dated 
liability profiles.‖  By July 2005 it was closed after reaching its target of €1.5bn in commitments from major 
international investors.  
 
To date the fund has made nine investments: 
 100 per cent of Arlanda Express, the high speed rail service linking Sweden's Arlanda airport to 
Stockholm city center 
 10 per cent interest in Brussels International Airport (within a Macquarie consortium that owns 70% 
of the airport) 
 100 per cent of Thames Water  - technically 51% through the fund and the rest via various pension 
fund investments through Macqarie). A 50.1 per cent interest in UK utility South East Water  was 
sold in October 2006 to enable the purchase of Thames to go through. 
 31.0 per cent of Wales & West Utilities, a UK gas distribution network 
 49 per cent of NRE Holding N.V., a gas and electricity distribution network in the Netherlands* 
 100 per cent of Energy Power Resources Limited (UK), which owns and manages the UK's largest 
portfolio of biomass fuelled renewable energy assets 
 100 per cent of Energy Power Resources (Europe), a portfolio of generation assets across six wind 
farms in France and Sweden 
 100 per cent of Wightlink Shipping Limited, the leading operator of passenger and ferry services 
between the UK mainland and the Isle of Wight 
 a stake in the French motorway network, Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-Rhône (APRR), in partnership with 
the Macquarie Infrastructure Group and Eiffage SA. 
5.8. Montagu Private Equity 
http://www.montagu.co.uk/ 
Montagu is an European private equity investor, since 1968, backing management buyouts and other private 
equity deals, normally acting as the principal equity provider.   It was formerly the private equity arm of 
HSBC, which sold it to a management buyout in 2003, when it was renamed Montagu PE. HSBC retains 
19.9% of the shares.  It operates through offices in London, Manchester, Paris, Düsseldorf and Stockholm, 
and invests in a wide range of businesses, across a number of sectors, including consumer goods and retail, 
manufacturing, and services.  The following table shows the range of these investments: those in service 
sectors or utilities are highlighted in bold. 
 
Company  Business  Price  Year  Status  
Cory Environmental Waste Management £200m 2005 In Portfolio 
Survitec Group Safety and survival products £146m 2004 In Portfolio 
Isle of Man Steam Packet Ferry operator £162m 2003 Realised 
LINPAC Packaging £860m 2003 In Portfolio 
Risdon Pharma Pharma packaging €97m 2002 Realised 
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Dignity Caring Funeral Services Funeral services £235m 2002 Realised 
M & M Medical Private hospitals £34m 1999 Realised 
Ashbourne Pharmaceuticals Drug distribution £32m 1999 In Portfolio 
Auto Windscreens Windscreen replacement £98m 1998 Realised 
TM Group (Thistledove) Convenience stores £184m 1998 In Portfolio 
Harwich International Port operator £77m 1997 Realised 
Warrior Group Consumer credit £104m 1997 Realised 
Abbey Hospitals Private hospitals £12m 1997 Realised 
Clinphone Voice response systems £10m 1997 In Portfolio 
Transport Research Foundation Transportation research £14m 1996 Realised 
Xtra-Vision Video distribution network £12m 1996 Realised 
Elysia Bus operator £6m 1995 Realised 
BCH Vehicle Management Fleet management £140m 1995 Realised 
TM Group (Gallagher) Convenience stores £173m 1995 Realised 
ANC Group Parcel delivery £50m 1995 Realised 
London General Bus operator £32m 1994 Realised 
London United Bus operator £26m 1994 Realised 
Belfast Airport Airport operator £35m 1994 Realised 
Centrewest London Buses Bus operator £27m 1994 Realised 
Melville Exhibition Services Exhibition contractor £14m 1994 Realised 
Benfield Insurance £50m 1994 Realised 
Croydon Land / Estates Property management £58m 1994 Realised 
Greater Manchester Buses South Bus operator £28m 1994 Realised 
Security Pacific Insurance Group Insurance £5m 1994 Realised 
Innovex Healthcare trials £82m 1993 Realised 
Clydeport Port operator £20m 1992 Realised 
First Corporate Shipping Port operator £42m 1991 Realised 
Alan Turner Insurance £13m 1990 Realised 
Yarrow Young Insurance £4m 1989 Realised 
5.9. Terra Firma 
http://www.terrafirma.com/page____102.aspx .   
Terra Firma was created in 2002 out of the Principal Finance Group, a division of Nomura that was created 
in 1994. It ―focuses on buyouts of large, asset-rich and complex businesses in need of operational and/or 
strategic change‖.  The company sees privatisations as a key source of opportunities: ―the current focus 
across Europe on core activities by both governments and private companies is expected to provide a steady 
stream of divestments and privatisations of exactly the businesses and assets that we target.‖   
 
It gets involved in managing its investments, emphasising its concern to maximise the returns for investors: 
― We add value through integrating ourselves directly into the companies we buy. Our in-house operational 
team works closely with our financial team during the due diligence phase of each deal and then, post-
acquisition, they go directly into the company, often forming an integral part of interim management…..The 
firm has a hands-on management style, working directly with its portfolio businesses to overhaul operations 
and transform strategy.‖ 
 
The company has made just 22 investments since 1994. On average, Terra Firma invested about €345m in 
each one.  The most recent include Tank & Rast, a chain of 340 restaurants and petrol stations throughout 
Germany; Odeon and UCI cinemas, the largest cinema operator in Europe; and Waste Recycling Group 
[since sold in 2006 to FCC]. 
 
In May 2005 Terra Firma ―sealed the biggest private equity deal in Germany by agreeing to pay about €7bn 
for Viterra, a portfolio of 150,000 apartments owned by utility Eon..‖81   According to the FT ―Germany's 
homegrown private equity sector is tiny and foreign companies, mostly from the US, have dominated the 
acquisition of German companies in recent years, prompting an outcry in some quarters that the country is 
selling out to foreigners.‖82 In May 2006 the commercial property part of Viterra was sold off by the German 
subsidiary of Terra Firma, Deutsche Annington. Both this company, and its U.K. counterpart Annington 
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Homes Ltd. were formed from privatized government-owned housing: ―The U.K. company held former 
British Ministry of Defence married-housing quarters, while the German company held former state railway 
properties.‖ 83 
 
Annington Homes Housing Sep-96 2,570 
Deutsche Annington Housing Dec-00 2,250 
HBS Outsourcing Dec-00 150 
Viterra Housing Aug-05 6,500 
Waste Recycling Group Waste Management  Jul-03 836 
Shanks Waste Management Jun-04 357 
BGCL Utilities May-05 141 
East Surrey Holdings  Utilities Oct-05 964 
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